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SEC Rulemaking Authority and the Protection of
Investors: A Comment on the Proposed
"Going Private" Rules
"Going private" is the term used to describe techniques whereby a
publicly held corporation returns to private status by reacquisition of
all publicly held stock, thereby excluding public shareholders from fur-
ther participation in the enterprise.1 Going private programs have been
undertaken (a) to alleviate a perceived incompatibility between prudent
management and the pressures accompanying public ownership ;2 (b) to
free the corporation from the expense of complying with federal report-
ing requirements and to regain the confidentiality of corporate informa-
tion;' (c) to reconsolidate insider control; and (d) to profit from a
successful share reacquisition program.4 A handful of highly publicized
1 Going private methods most commonly employed include tender offers for the re-
acquisition of outstanding shares, take-out mergers, and reverse stock splits. See generally
Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort, or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 987, 988
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Borden]. The first stage of a going private program is often
a cash or debt tender offer. Stockholders who tender their shares during the life of the
offer receive the offered price; the offerors have generally agreed among themselves not to
tender the shares they hold. The offering group is therefore left as surviving shareholders
in a privately held company. See Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 907-11 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Going Private]. The second stage may find the controlling group under-
taking to remove the remaining shareholders who have declined the offer to tender.
Alternatively, a repurchase program can lead to a majority decision in favor of merger
or dissolution. State merger statutes set disclosure and procedural requirements for such
transactions, allowing the transaction where a requisite majority of shareholders approves;
some transactions trigger the appraisal remedy for dissenters. See Manning, The Share-
holder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 262-65 (1962),
for a classification by transaction of statutes giving rise to appraisal rights. See also Com-
ment, "Going Private": Establishing Federal Standards for the Forced Elimination of Pub-
lie Investors, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 638, 641-44 [hereinafter cited as Establishing Federal Stan-
dards]. A less common device is the reverse stock split, where a new security is exchanged
for outstanding shares at such a rate that only the largest shareholders will survive the
program holding more than a fractional interest. See, e.g., George Taylor Stewart v. Delta
Steamship Lines, Civ. Act. No. 74-538 (D.D.C. April 29, 1974) (exchange rate of one new
share for every 10,000 old shares). Unless the stockholder "rounds up", i.e., invests addi-
tional money to increase his interest to the equivalent of a whole share of the new securities,
his fractional interest can be forcibly acquired by the corporation pursuant to state law.
MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2d § 6(a) (1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 160, 243 (1974);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. §§ 513, 514 (McKinney 1963).
2Borden at 1006-18. See also Going Private at 904-11.
a In Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 514
F.2d 283 (1975), the specific motive was to remove difficulties hampering acquisition nego-
tiations as a result of reporting requirements under the federal securities laws, 386 F. Supp.
at 14; more generally, management argued that its tender offer was a response to "special
business problems inherent in the advertising business" and to changed conditions since it
went public in 1968, Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 5-7 [on file with the INDANA LAW
JOURNAL].
4 SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommer, Jr., in discussing the offer made in Kaufmann, criti-
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cases have involved dissenting shareholders pitted against their manage-
ments' efforts to go private.5 In all, more than 60 public companies
sought private status in 1974 and 1975,6 and Banker's Trust of New
York estimated that market conditions in early 1975 made "potential
candidates" of at least another 900 companies. 7
The increasingly frequent resort to going private has drawn sharp
criticism,' and the SEC announced in February 1975 that it would con-
sider the adoption of rules governing the practice.' The SEC proposes
to require both the disclosure of certain information" and compliance
cized the propriety of consolidation of insider control as well as the profitmaking potential
of such transactions.
In one recent instance public offerings netted $696,000 for the corporation, over
$125,000,000 for the offering shareholders. The corporation has now proposed to
acquire all the stock held by minority shareholders for $11.00 per share. If all of
the minority shareholders tender, they would receive $3.00 in cash and $8.00 in
ten year subordinated debentures (which the company believes will sell at a sub-
stantial discount) for shares which were originally offered at $17.50 a share and
three years ago at $21.75 a share; the dominant shareholder [Lawrence] would go
from a 7% interest to 43%, with over 3.7 million dollars (less taxes) provided by
the public now safely locked up for her benefit. On a pro forma basis, had all
public shares been repurchased on the basis proposed at the beginning of 1973, the
corporate profits attributable to her interest would have risen from $236,000 to
$1,107,000 in 1973-over 400%-and from $167,000 to $688,000 for the first ten
months of 1974-again over 400%-and without a single dime of additional in-
vestment by her!
Sommer, "Going Private": A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility, 278 BNA Szc. REG. &
L. REP. D-1, at D-3 (1974).
5 Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ; University Capital Corp. v.
Barbara Lynn Stores, Inc., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. f1 94,949
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Rapoport v. Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc., Civil No. CV 74-248 (C.D.
Cal. filed Jan. 30, 1974); Berkowitz v. Power Mate Corp., 309 BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP.
A-8 (N.J. Super. Ct. May 8, 1975); Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., [Current] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. 95,219 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1975) (preliminary injunction denied in suit claim-
ing violations of Rule 10b-5). But see People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 307 BNA SEc. REG.
& L. REP. A-15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 12, 1975), aff'd mem., N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1976, § 3,
at 15, col. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., App. Div., December 24, 1975) (permanent injunction against
Concord Fabrics merger with AFW Fabric Corp. granted to Atty. General under Martin
Law).
6 Bender, The Battle Over 'Going Private,' N.Y. Times, July 13, 1975, § 3, at 1, col. 4.
7 Hershman, Going Private-Or How to Squeeze Investors, DUN'S REviEw, Jan. 1975,
at 37.
8For example, Commissioner Sommer has characterized going private abuse as "serious,
unfair, and sometimes disgraceful, a perversion of the whole process of public financing,
and a course that inevitably is going to make the individual shareholder even more hostile
to American corporate mores and the securities markets than he already is." Sommer, supra
note 4, at D-2. See also Hershman, supra note 7, at 37; Lee, Going Private, 42 FINANCIAL
EXECUTivE 10 (1974); Freeman, Going Private: Corporate Insiders Move to Eliminate Out-
side Shareholders, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 18, 1974, at 1, col. 6; Lee, Why Companies
Want to Go Private, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1974, § 3, at 14, col. 3.
9 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5567 (February 6, 1975). The "rule 13e-3 transac-
tion" to be regulated is set out in rule 13e-3A, subparagraphs (a), (b), (d); and rule
13e-3B, subparagraphs (b), (c). See APPENDIX A.
10 Rule 13e-3A, subparagraphs (c)(1), (c)(3) (included in rule 13e-3B) are reproduced
as APPENDIX B.
GOING PRIVATE
with substantive fairness requirements. 1 The risks to shareholders'
rights and to public confidence in the securities markets posed by abuses
of insider strength in going private transactions may mandate such fed-
eral administrative regulation. Neither existing SEC regulation nor
state law has prevented corporate insiders from freezing out public share-
holders, while often reaping substantial profits. Dissenters have gener-
ally lacked any remedy beyond the only occasionally adequate appraisal
statutes.' 2  To determine whether federal regulation is warranted, and
to make a rational choice between the alternative formulations offered
in the proposed rules, 3 requires consideration of the following issues:
(a) how effectively do the proposed rules serve the policies underlying
federal securities regulation; (b) does the SEC's rulemaking authority
extend to the regulation of substantive fairness; and (c) will the pro-
posed rules serve to protect minority shareholders consistent with the
demands of other federal policies? This note addresses these questions,
and offers some conclusions regarding this proposed expansion of fed-
eral securities law.
"1 Rule 13e-3A, subparagraph (c) (2):
(2) The consideration for the equity securities to be purchased shall constitute
fair value to the security holders of such class of the issuer who are not affiliates
as determined in good faith by the issuer or its affiliate, and shall be no lower than
that recommended jointly by two qualified independent persons. Such persons, in
recommending the consideration, shall consider, among other factors, the value of
the assets and earning power of the issuer. They shall each:
(i) after reasonable investigation, have reasonable grounds to believe, and be-
lieve, that their jointly recommended consideration constitutes fair value to the
security holders of the issuer of such class who are not affiliates; and
(ii) submit to the issuer a written report and an opinion based thereon regard-
ing the fairness of the recommended consideration to security holders of the issuer
of such class who are not affiliates, setting forth the procedures followed, the basis
for and the method of arriving at the recommended consideration, and any limita-
tion imposed by the issuer or affiliate on the scope of the investigation; such report
and opinion shall be available for inspection and copying by any interested equity
security holder of the issuer at the executive offices of the issuer during its regular
business hours.
Rule 13e-3B, subparagraph (a):
(a) It shall be unlawful, as a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or
practice, for any issuer which has a class of equity securities registered under
Section 12 of the Act or which files reports pursuant to Section 15(d) of the Act
(the "issuer") or any person controlling, controlled by or under common control
with the issuer (an "affiliate"), to enter into any transaction involving a purchase,
directly or indirectly, of any equity security of the issuer which does have, or is
intended to have, any of the effects described in subsection (b) hereof unless:
(1) if such transaction is entered into by the issuer, such issuer has a valid
business purpose for doing so; and
(2) the terms of such transaction, including any consideration to be paid to
any security holder, are fair.
'2 Borden at 1023-27; Establishing Federal Standards at 655-56.
13 The alternative proposals offer significant differences, for example, in scope (compare
13e-3A (a) with 13e-3B (b)), and in the substantive fairness requirements to be applied
(compare 13e-3A (c) (2) with 13e-3B (a)).
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THE CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSED RULES
Shareholder Challenges to Going Private: State Law
A fundamental obstacle to shareholders seeking relief from going
private transactions has been the doctrine that the involuntary divesti-
ture of a shareholder's interest in a corporation is merely one risk of
investment. 4 State corporation statutes permit such action where the
requisite majority of stockholders approves the transaction, 15 and courts
are reluctant to strike such take-outs' 6 unless the transaction is shown
to have been undertaken primarily to exclude the minority.'1 State law
has traditionally provided some protection for shareholders threatened
by corporate transactions which effect a substantial change in the entity
in which they have invested.'" But minority shareholders, by definition,
cannot prevent even those transactions which require shareholder ap-
'4 See, e.g., Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D.
Fla. 1974): "[A] stockholder has no absolute rights to his interest in the corporation and
may be forced to surrender his shares for a fair cash price." Id. at 1403.
15 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. 2d §§ 71-73 (1971) provides for approval of merger
or consolidation by a simple majority vote; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (1974).
Comparable statutes in other jurisdictions require a two-thirds majority; see, e.g., N.Y.
Bus. CORP. § 903(a) (McKinney 1963). See generally Comment, Recent Developments in
the Law of Corporate Freeze-Outs, 14 B.C. IND. & CoMM. L. REV. 1252 (1973); Teschner
v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 59 Ill. 2d 452, 322 N.E.2d 54 (1974).
16 Or, as these transactions are pejoratively termed, "freeze-outs," defined as "any ac-
tion by those in control of the corporation which results in the termination of a stock-
holder's interest in the enterprise. . . . The term has come to imply a purpose to force a
liquidation or sale of the stockholder's shares, not incident to some other wholesome busi-
ness goal." Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77
HARV. L. REv. 1189, 1192-93 (1964).
17See, e.g., Theis v. Spokane Falls Gas Light Co., 34 Wash. 23, 74 Pac. 1004 (1904).
But see Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel, Inc., 202 Misc. 988, 115 N.Y.S.2d 52 (Sup. CL
1952). See generally Note, Freezing Out Minority Shareholders, 74 HARV. L. Rxv. 1630
(1961). Where it could not be demonstrated that such actions were pursuant to a "busi-
ness purpose," however, courts have occasionally been willing to find a breach of the ma-
jority's fiduciary obligations to the minority. E.g., Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d
563 (5th Cir.) (applying Georgia law), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974); Condec Corp. v.
Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (Ch. 1967); Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum
Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 6, 99 A.2d 236 (Ch. 1953); cf. Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286,
242 P.2d 1025 (1952).
On the controlling stockholders' fiduciary relationship to the minority, see Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 316 U.S. 675 (1942); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947).
18 See MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT. ANN. 2d §§ 71-79 (1971).
The Comment to section 73 of the Model Act relates the fundamental change effected
in the identity of the business entity by merger or consolidation to the sound reasons
thought to underlie requiring more than a simple majority for shareholder approval. While
the original Act required a two-thirds vote of approval, concern with the need to prevent
a comparatively small minority from effectively thwarting the wishes of the majority led
in 1969 to amending the Model Act to the present simple majority formula. MODEL Bus.
CORP. AT. ANN. 2d § 73 ff 2 (1971). See also N.Y. Bus. CORP. § 903(a) (McKinney 1963)
(requires two-thirds vote); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (1974) (majority vote).
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proval 9 and, as will be demonstrated, state appraisal rights20 have pro-
vided no guarantee that shareholders will receive a fair price. Further-
more, the most common going private device, a tender offer, requires
neither shareholder approval nor appraisal rights.21
For a minority stockholder forced out in a going private program,
appraisal, even where available, is an inadequate remedy for at least two
reasons. First, the opportunity for a true reevaluation of the stock's
worth depends upon the absence of a market for the stock.22 Where an
active market for the stock exists, courts tend to award the dissenter
the market price on the grounds that it represents per se fair value.23
Appraisal is therefore likely to be an illusory remedy, because the very
decision to go private is commonly motivated by the opportunity for a
profitable corporate repurchase occasioned by a low market price.2 4 Where
the most to be gained is the market value, no rational shareholder would
seek through the courts a sum which he could have received through a
market sale, without more expense than a broker's commission. Secondly,
the delay, uncertainty and expense of pursuing the appraisal remedy will
often dissuade the shareholder from seeking it,25 even in the rare situa-
tion where the statute might enable him to recover something more than
the current market price.2"
19 For discussion of use of merger, asset sale, and dissolution to go private, see Borden
at 989-99; Going Private at 909-11.
20 For a critical view of the notion that such statutes protect the minority, when in
fact their more significant effect is to give "greater mobility of action to the majority-
that is, to corporate managements speaking in the name of the majority," see Manning,
supra note 1, at 226-30.
21 Going Private at 910.
22 Manning, supra note 1, at 231-32. Aside from the general threat of illiquidity posed
by going private, the absence of a market may occur where, for example, public com-
pany A through merger becomes private company B; a hold-out stockholder in A, after
completion of the going private transaction, holds an unmarketable equity.
23 "In the case of a publicly held corporation, depressed market prices may be deter-
minative of fair price, with the result that minority shareholders may be forced out of the
corporation for a 'fair' price that is less than the asset value of their holdings." Establish-
ing Federal Standards at 656-57; Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal
Statutes, 79 HARv. L. RaV. 1453, 1469 (1966). See, e.g., Jones v. Healy, 184 Misc. 923,
55 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1945), aff'd, 270 App. Div. 895, 62 N.Y.S.2d 605 (1946); Gallois v. West
End Chem. Co., 185 Cal. App. 2d 765, 8 Cal. Reptr. 596 (1960); David J. Greene & Co. v.
Schenley Indus., Inc., - Del Ch. - , 281 A.2d 30 (Ch. 1971); cf. Tome Land & Im-
provement Co. v. Silva, 83 N.M. 549, 494 P.2d 962 (1972). See generally Annot., 48
A.L.R.3d 430 (1973).
24 For example, Concord Fabrics' public offerings in 1968 and 1969 resulted in the sale
of 300,000 shares at $15 per share and 200,000 at $20 per share respectively. A going private
merger and tender offer in February 1975 offered dissenters $3 per share, as against a then
current market price of around $1. Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., [Current] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 9195,219 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1975).25 See Manning, supra note 1; Vorenberg, supra note 16.
26 For example, where a stockholder in corporation A dissents from a merger with
corporation B, and his stock market price precipitously declines after announcement of the
19761
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That state corporation statutes and appraisal remedies are inade-
quate to protect minority shareholders in a going private transaction
should be apparent: statutes requiring shareholder approval of corporate
transactions provide no check upon the coercive aspects27 of a going
private program, and appraisal is either unavailable or inadequate. State
law in effect authorizes the majority to divest the minority of its in-
terests, and generally leaves the dissenters without an assurance of
receiving "fair consideration" for the shares subject to involuntary
divestment.2
8
Shareholder Challenges to Going Private: Federal Law
The policies underlying the federal role in securities transactions
are the protection of investors and the protection of the integrity of the
securities markets.2 9 In the service of these policies, the federal securi-
ties laws employ complementary disclosure requirements and antifraud
regulations. The rationale behind the federal disclosure requirements 30
is that investors will act in the interest of the national economy, and
will require less direct protection, when they are provided with the in-
formation necessary to make reasoned financial decisions." It is there-
fore a matter of federal policy that investors be provided with adequate
relevant information. However, existing disclosure requirements32 were
formulated before the advent of the going private phenomenon, and
they have failed to provide shareholders with sufficient information
relevant to the decisions involved in those transactions.
33
merger, he is entitled to disregard the drop in market price for purposes of appraisal. Man-
ning, supra note 1, at 231.
27 See Going Private at 913-22; Establishing Federal Standards at 649-58.
28 Judicial review of the fairness of price is often withheld due to the "exclusiveness"
of appraisal rights, either statutory or implied. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, §§ 76,
86-98 (1970) (appraisal exclusive remedy absent allegations of fraud or illegality); MODEL
Bus. CORP. AcT. ANN. 2d § 81 (1971); Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7,
187 A.2d 78 (1962); McGhee v. General Finance Corp., 84 F. Supp. 24 (W.D. Va. 1949);
Bruce v. E.L. Bruce Co., 40 Del. Ch. 80, 174 A.2d 29 (Ch. 1961); Morris v. Columbia
Apartments Corp., 323 Ill. App. 292, 55 N.E.2d 401 (1944); Geiger v. American Seeding
Mach. Co., 124 Ohio St. 222, 177 N.E. 594 (1931) (dictum); Note, Interplay of Rights of
Stockholders Dissenting from Sale of Corporate Assets, 58 COL-um. L. REv. 251, 255 (1958);
Vorenberg, supra note 16, at 1195-99.
Dissenters seeking to enjoin the transaction, or to have the court review allegations of
breach of fiduciary obligations owed the minority by the majority, often fail because ap-
praisal is available to them. E.g., David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc.,
Del. Ch. -, 281 A.2d 30 (Ch. 1971).
29 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970).
30 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o, 78p, 78r (1970).
31 Note, Corporate Repurchases Under the Federal Securities Laws, 66 CoLumr. L. REV.
1292, 1296 (1966).
32For discussion of disclosure provisions affecting going private transactions, see Borden
at 1028-35.
33 It has been argued that "it would be best to adhere to established disclosure rules
and to rely upon the shareholder's innate suspicion that things are going well if the in-
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The federal securities regulations also provide for a concerted attack
upon fraud in the securities markets. Section 10b of the 1934 Act"
and its implementing rule 10b-535 have been the foundation for much
of the development in federal securities law.36 Tender offers are spe-
siders propose to go private," id. at 1029. But the concern should be with the shareholder's
ability, not to discern how the company is faring, but rather to assess the adequacy of any
price offered or contemplated to be paid for his equity. In that respect, the requirement
proposed in rule 13e-3A, that the issuer disclose the price of shares sold in and aggregate
proceeds of any public offerings within the last five years, at least gives the target share-
holder a more meaningful basis upon which to calculate the adequacy of the offered price
in a going private transaction. Rule 13e-3A(c) (1) (xvi), APPEDmIX B.
34 It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . . .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as neces-
sary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
48 Stat. 891 (June 6, 1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). The delegation of broad rulemaking
authority for the protection of investors and the public against fraud met with little debate
at the time of its adoption. See 1 A. BRo0BERG, SEcuRIES LAw § 2.2 at 331 (1974).
35 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975) :
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id. Promulgated in SEC Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
36Landmark cases in the development of lab-S include Ward La France Truck Corp.,
13 S.E.C. 373 (1943); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946)
(implication of seller's cause of action for damages), subseq. opinions, 73 F. Supp. 798
(E.D. Pa. 1947), 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188
F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951) (implication of buyer's cause of action for damages); Speed v.
Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951) (10b-5 applied to tender offer, securi-
ties redemption); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952) (buyer-
seller requirement held to exclude allegations of corporate mismanagement from reach of
10b-5); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (material non-disclosure of insider
knowledge held in violation of 10b-5); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375
U.S. 180 (1963) (broad interpretation of nature of fraud actionable under federal securities
laws, scienter held unnecessary in suit under antifraud provision analogous to 10b-5);
.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (implied cause of action for violation of anti-
fraud proxy rule); O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964) (lOb-S action requires
allegation of 'deception'); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), aff'd, 401 F.2d 833 (1968) (adoption of Cady, Roberts rule, formulating policy of
equal access for investors to material information as a sine qua non of equal access to
rewards of participation in securities transactions); Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374
F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967) (buyer-seller requirement relaxed); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow,
375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967) (10b-5 applies to all fraud in securities transactions, not merely
fraud under the common law); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d
Cir. 1967) (shareholder's right to sue for injunction recognized); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,
405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (permitting derivative suit to challenge company's sale of
securities at inadequate price to persons with controlling influence); SEC v. National Se-
curities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969) (merger held within requirement of "a sale or pur-
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cifically regulated by sections 14(d) and 14(e) of the Act,"' which im-
pose disclosure requirements and an antifraud provision closely parallel-
ing rule 10b-5."5 Nevertheless, shareholder attempts to characterize the
terms of a going private tender offer as fraudulent under rule 10b-5
have proved only occasionally successful.39 The dissenting shareholders
have found federal courts generally reluctant to look beyond the issue of
compliance with the disclosure requirements.4" In the absence of spe-
cific regulation, federal courts have not, as a rule,4 1 been willing to re-
view the propriety of the insiders' actions.
As a result, the federal securities laws thus far have not afforded
the shareholder a forum in which to object that going private will in-
voluntarily deprive him of his ownership interest, operate as a fraud
upon him by divesting him of that interest without adequate compensa-
tion, or disappoint his expectation that investment in a public company
carries with it the benefits of both federal disclosure requirements and
the more regorous federal protection against insider trading and fraudu-
lent practices.4" It is commonly considered a disturbing prospect4 3 that
a public company, which engages in substantial interstate commerce,
and has shares listed on the national exchanges, can force out minority
interests in full compliance with existing federal and state law.
It is clear that the rules proposed by the SEC are intended to close
the gap into which going private transactions seem to fall, a gap be-
tween the policies underlying the federal regulation of securities trans-
actions and the conception of management-stockholder relationships as
chase"; 10b-5 applied to proxy solicitation); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and
Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (10b-5 applied to violation of fiduciary obligation); Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (recognition of Birnbaum seller-
purchaser requirement in 10b-5 actions).
37 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d), (e) (1970).
38 Id.
39 See cases cited note 5 supra.
40 See Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 514
F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975); Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
IT 95,219 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1975).
41 But see Albright v. Bergendahl, 391 F. Supp. 754 (D. Utah 1974).
42 Commissioner Sommer has suggested there be implied a promise on the part of com-
panies going public that they will remain public. Sommer, supra note 4, at D-4. One court
was willing to imply, based on a statement in the prospectus that the company would seek
listing on the New York Stock Exchange, a promise that it would not voluntarily under-
take any action that would lead to delisting unless pursuant to a proper corporate purpose.
United Funds v. Carter Products, Inc., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 91 91,288 (Baltimore Cir. Ct. 1963).
43 This is especially so in view of a traditionally hostile judicial attitude toward freeze-
outs. See Borden at 990; Sommer, supra note 4; Vorenberg, supra note 16, at 1194; News
& Comment, Investor Comments Favor SEC "Going Private" Proposals, Bar Opposes Them,
318 BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. A-1 (1975); Sommer, Further Thoughts On "Going Private,"
SEC News, March 14, 1975, at 3-4.
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a matter for state corporation law." The proposed rules must be exam-
ined to determine the extent to which they would serve the federal poli-
44 One court interpreted the congressional intent in setting up the SEC to have been
"to leave the states free to exercise such regulatory control over the sale of securities as does
not conflict with the provisions of the Federal Act, and, in the absence of such a conflict,
it is contemplated that the States and the Federal Government shall exercise concurrent
jurisdiction in this field." Travelers Health Ass'n. v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 877, 897, 51
S.E.2d 263, 271 (1949), affd, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
In McCiure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939
(1961), the court said in often quoted dictum:
[The 1934] Act deals with the protection of investors, primarily stockholders. It
creates many managerial duties and liabilities unknown to the common law. It ex-
presses federal interest in management-stockholder relationships which theretofore
had been almost exclusively the concern of the states. Section 10(b) imposes broad
fiduciary duties on management vis-a-vis the corporation and its individual stock-
holders. As implemented by Rule 10(b)-5 and Section 29(b), Section 10(b) pro-
vides stockholders with a potent weapon for enforcement of many fiduciary duties.
It can be said fairly that the Exchange Act . . . constitutes far reaching federal
substantive corporation law.
292 F.2d at 834.
To subject a going private transaction to scrutiny under existing federal law, a dissenter
must make out a 10b-5 claim, which requires a disclosure violation. See, e.g., Popkin v.
Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972). Where the d:ssenter cannot prevail on the 10b-5
ground, the federal court can administer any remedies arising under state law through ex-
ercise of pendent jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., Inc., 490 F.2d 563
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974) (trial court found a merger adopted solely to
divest plaintiff of his investment at less than true value; affirming that the transaction vio-
lated Georgia law, the court declined to rule on the finding that it also violated plaintiff's
rights under federal securities laws). In the absence of a lob-5 claim, federal courts have
no statute to apply. In denying a preliminary injunction in Kaufmann the court said:
The issue raised is undeniably serious and troublesome. The public has invested
some $14 million in the company. The decision to buy out the public during the
current depressed market will enable the public shares to be repossessed at a frac-
tion of the original cost to the public shareholders.
This is really the basic issue and principle which plaintiff seeks to litigate. ....
Whether the offer is fair or unfair or a good or a bad transaction, however, does
not raise a federal question.
386 F. Supp. at 16. The federal securities laws "in respect of their design and interpretive
reach . .. are satisfied if a full and fair disclosure is made . . . .' Id. at 17.
However, transactions that gave rise to no federal claim have been enjoined on state
grounds. Compare Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., [Current] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
ff 95,219 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1975) with People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 307 BNA SEc.
REG. & L. REP. A-15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 12, 1975) aff'd mem., N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1976,
§ 3, at 15, col. 1. The discussion of the proper reach of the federal securities laws is far
from resolved. See generally Bloomenthal, From Birnbaum to Schoenbaum: The Exchange
Act and Self-Aggrandizement, 15 N.Y.L.F. 332 (1969); Cary, Federalism and Corporate
Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Fleischer, "Federal Corpora-
tLion Law": An Assessment, 78 HaRv. L. Rv. 1146 (1965); Jacobs, Birnbaum In Flux:
Significant 10b-5 Developments, 2 SEc. PEG. L.J. 305 (1975); Lowenfels, The Demise of
the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule lob-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268 (1968); Moskowitz,
Corporate Stock Repurchases Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 51 NEB. L. REv.
193 (1971); Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of Corporations by Im-
plication Through Rule iob-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 185 (1964); Comment, Recent Develop-
ments in the Law of Corporate Freeze-Outs, 14 B.C. IND. & Comm. L. REv. 1252 (1973);
Note, Corporate Stock Repurchases Under the Federal Securities Laws, 66 COLUm. L. Rv.
1292 (1966); Comment, Fiduciary Suits Under Rule 1Ob-5, 1968 Duxa L.J. 791.
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cies, as well as whether the regulation of the purpose of the going private
transaction is within the authority of the SEC.
SUBSTANTIVE FAIRNESS REQUIREMENTS UNDER
PROPOSED RULE 13E- 45
Given the inherently coercive nature of the tender offer device in
going private,46 and the unwillingness of federal courts to deal with
45 The proposed rules, in two alternative forms, deal with a "rule 13e-3 transaction";
with respect to matters common to both proposed forms, this 13e-3 designation is followed
in the text. Where matters are found in only one, the two forms are designated 13e-3A
and 13e-3B.
Proposed rule 13e-3A(a) (5):
(5) Rule 13e-3 Transaction. A "Rule 13e-3 transaction" is any transaction de-
scribed in subsection (i) which, directly or indirectly, might have any of the
effects or is part of a plan which might have any of the effects described in
subparagraph (ii) :
(i) Types of Transactions:
(A) a purchase of any equity security;
(B) a cash tender offer, an exchange offer, or any other tender offer for
or request or invitation for tenders of any equity security; or
(C) a solicitation of any proxy, consent or authorization of a holder of
any equity security in connection with any merger, consolidation or
similar business combination transaction between an issuer (or its sub-
sidiaries) and its affiliate; a sale of substantially all of the assets of
an issuer to its affiliate; or a reverse split of any equity security in-
volving the purchase of fractional shares.
(ii) Effects of Transaction:
(A) causing a class of equity securities to be subject to delisting from a
national securities exchange;
(B) causing a class of equity securities to be eligible for termination of
registration pursuant to Section 12(g) (4) of the Act;
(C) causing an issuer to be eligible for suspension of reporting obligations
pursuant to Section 15(d) of the Act as at the beginning of the next
fiscal year of the issuer; or
(D) causing a class of equity securities which is authorized to be quoted
in an inter-dealer quotation system of a registered national securities
association to cease to be so authorized.
Proposed rule 13e-3B(b):
(b) [The rule] shall apply to any transaction which has, or is intended to
have, any of the following effects:
(1) compelling any security holder of the issuer to terminate his equity interest
in the issuer;
(2) reducing, directly or indirectly, by 25 percent or more, the amount of any
class of equity securities of the issuer outstanding prior to the transaction and
held beneficially by persons other than the issuer and its affiliates;
(3) causing a class of equity securities of the issuer to be subject to delisting from
a national securities exchange;
(4) causing a class of equity securities of the issuer to be eligible for termination
of registration pursuant to Section 12(g) (4) of the Act;
(5) causing the issuer to be eligible for suspension of reporting obligations pur-
suant to Section 15(d) of the Act as at the beginning of the next fiscal year
of the issuer; or
(6) causing a class of equity securities of the issuer which is authorized to be
quoted in an inter-dealer quotation system of a registered national securities
association to cease to be so authorized.
SEC Securities Act Release No. 5567 (Feb. 6, 1975).
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fairness issues under rule 10b-5,47 it must be concluded that disclosure
requirements can be of only limited effectiveness in protecting minority
shareholder interests in going private transactions. The proposed rules
accordingly offer two alternative formulations which attempt to regu-
late substantive fairness in going private. Proposed Rules 13e-3A and
18e-3B require, respectively, fair price alone,48 or fair price and fair
"terms," and a proper purpose in going private.4 9
Rule 13e-3A apparently rejects any federal inquiry into the motive
behind the transaction, in accordance with the view that divestment of
ownership status, so long as fair compensation is paid, is but one of the
many risks of investment and not a proper object of federal interest.80
Rule 13e-3A provides only that the offered consideration must "consti-
tute fair value"-at a minimum, "fair value" as determined by two
independent appraisers.8"
Rule 13e-3B, on the other hand, demands that the "terms of such
transaction, including any consideration to be paid" be fair, 2 and in
addition attempts to protect shareholders from freezeout by requiring
that the transaction be pursuant to a "valid business purpose."53 This
note will first discuss the authority of the SEC to enact such a test
through its rulemaking procedures, and will then examine the efficacy
of such a standard.
Limits on the Rulemaking Authority of the SEC:
The "Valid Business Purpose" Test
A threshold question with respect to Rule 13e-3B's "valid business
purpose" requirement concerns the SEC's authority to promulgate such
a provision. Section 13e of the 1934 Securities Exchange Acte4 em-
powers the SEC to enact rules and regulations with respect to issuer
share repurchases,
to define acts and practices which are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipu-
lative, and.., to prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent such
acts and practices. Such rules and regulations may require such issuer
46 See Going Private at 928-29.
47 Note 5 supra.
48 Rule 13e-3A(c) (2) (i).
49 Rule 13e-3B (a).
50 The notion of "vested shareholder rights," inviolate at common law, has given way
to the need for corporate flexibility. Borden at 1020-21. See Establishing Federal Stan-
dards at 653-54.
51 Rule 13e-3A(c) (2).
52 Rule 13e-3B (a) (2).
53 Rule 13e-3B (a) (1).
54 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1970) (originally enacted as Act of July 29, 1968, § 2, 82
Stat. 455.)
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to provide holders ... with such information . . . as the Commission
deems necessary or appropriate. 55
An examination of the relevant legislative history indicates an intent on
the part of Congress to limit the SEC's rulemaking authority. Although
this section delegated authority to set disclosure requirements, it was
also intended to deny the Commission the power to regulate substan-
tive fairness.
Section 13e is a part of the 1968 Williams Act amendments to the
1934 Act. 6 The original language of the bill as reported to the Senate
employed a disjunctive construction which implied the delegation of a
broad rulemaking power to the SEC:
(e) (1) It shall be unlawful for an issuer, to purchase any equity se-
curity which it has issued in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors or in order
to prevent such acts and practices as are fraudilent, deceptive, or
manipulative.57
This formulation met with the objection that its breadth would empower
the SEC to infringe upon the traditional state governance of questions
of fairness and conflicts of interest in issuer repurchases of shares.'
These misgivings were confirmed in a prepared statement by then SEC
Chairman Manuel F. Cohen:
[E]ven where the management has no improper motive in repurchas-
ing securities, substantial repurchase programs will inevitably affect
market performance and price levels. That is why we believe that the
rule-making authority contained in the bills would be a valuable ad-
55 Id.
56 Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, amending 15 U.S.C. § 78m
(1970).
57 S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1967) (emphasis added).
58 See, e.g., letter from the Ass'n. of the Bar of the City of New York to the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, June 28, 1968, in Hearings on S. 510 Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968):
In our view, this proposal represents an unnecessary and unwarranted departure
from the concepts of investor protection which the Federal regulatory power has
been traditionally designed to provide ...
The proposal is broad enough to permit the adoption of rules that would be
in conflict with, and would override, the substantive state law which has tradi-
tionally governed questions of corporate repurchases of stock and it certainly will
permit the Commission to substitute its judgment for that of the issuer's man-
agement in the area. Under it, the Commission appears to be given power to regu-
late the price and other terms of an issuer repurchase, the amount of the repur-
chase, and the timing and method thereof. On its terms, it arguably is broad
enough to permit the Commission if in its judgment it is necessary or appropriate
I... in the public interest or for the protection of investors . . .' to prohibit re-
purchases completely.
Id. at 73-74.
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junct to our authority under the existing antifraud provisions of
the Act.
The provisions of the bills would make it unlawful for an issuer
to purchase its own securities in contravention of rules or regulations
which the Commission adopts... irrespective of the question whether,
or our ability to prove that, such activity is or may be fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative.59
The House Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance responded by
amending the bill and reporting it out in its present form:
(.e) (1) It shall be unlawful for an issuer ... to purchase any equity
security issued by it if such purchase is in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission, in the public interest or for the
protection of investors, may adopt (A) to define acts and practices
which are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative, and '(B) to pre-
scribe means reasonably designed to prevent such acts and practices.0
The Subcommittee report explained that the amendment was made
to clarify the intent ... that the rules to be adopted by the Commis-
sion covering the purchase by an issuer of its own securities were re-
lated solely (A) to define acts and practices which are fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative, and (B) to prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent such acts and practices.0 1
The amendment was explained further on the House floor by Represen-
tative Moss:
The original language might have been interpreted, although not so
intended, as giving the Commission a broader basis for the prescrip-
tion of rules unassociated with this purpose. The committee amend-
ment makes it clear . . that the rules and regulations are to be de-
signed to provide the information and procedures which the Commis-
sion feels are necessary in the public interest to provide means reason-
ably designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts.62
69 Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
60 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1) (1970) (emphasis added).
61
The . . . amendment was made . . . following consideration of the original lan-
guage of the subsection which was in the disjunctive and lent itself to the possible
although improbable interpretation that the Commission had authority to issue
rules or regulations regarding the corporate purchase of its own securities in the
public interest, or for the protection of investors, quite apart from whether de-
signed solely to prevent acts and practices that are fraudulent, deceptive of [sic]
manipulative. The revised language makes it clear that such rules and regulations
may be adopted only for these purposes.
H.R. REp. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1968) (emphasis added).
62114 CONG. REc. 21484 (1968) (emphasis added). See also 114 CONG. REc. 21954
(1968) (remarks of Sen. Bennett):
The House amended our bill to make this intent dear in language to the effect
that rules and regulations to be adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion covering the purchase of an issuer of its own securities were to be related
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On its face, then, the language of section 13e might have supported an
argument that going private without a "valid business purpose" was a
fraudulent practice which the SEC might reach.13 But such a construc-
tion conflicts with the congressional intent to deny the SEC authority
to regulate the purposes of corporate transactions, or in any other way
prohibit transactions for broad policy reasons unrelated to "fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative" practices. 64
Furthermore, apart from the stricture which the legislative history
imposes upon the language of section 13e, it would be inconsistent with
the statutory scheme in which that section operates to "define" as fraudu-
lent any going private transaction which lacks a valid business purpose.
The federal securities laws specifically provide for deregulation of com-
panies65 and delisting of their shares from the national exchanges6
without regard to corporate purposes. It therefore seems unlikely that
Congress intended, or would have approved, empowering the Commis-
sion to define fraudulent practices as a device for regulation of the man-
agement motive in going private. Rather, the conclusion must be that
the SEC is not empowered to define a transaction as fraudulent if with-
out a "valid business purpose."
solely to define acts and practices which are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipula-
tive, and to prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent such acts and practices.
I believe that this distinction is extremely important, because the requirements
that may be established under the bill include providing the holders of equity
securities with information relating to the reasons for such purchase, the source
of funds, the number of shares to be purchased, the price to be paid for such
securities, the method of purchase, and such additional information as the Com-
mission deems necessary or appropriate.
This type of disclosure is obviously not necessary in the ordinary purchase of
shares by a company for distribution under a stock option, employees' stock pur-
chase, employees' saving, bonus, or incentive plan. Because such plans can be used
in certain circumstances for manipulation or other purposes, it is important that
the SEC set up definitions of which practices are considered improper and estab-
lish means to prevent those practices while not disrupting or adversely affecting
legitimate purchases.
Id.
63 Kerr, Going Private: Adopting a Corporate Purpose Standard, 3 Stc. RErc. L.J. 33,
35 (1975).
64 The clearest statement of the congressional purpose to limit the rulemaking author-
ity of the Commission, so as to deny it the authority to prevent transactions on grounds
unrelated to fraudulent practices, concerned the parts of the Williams Bill proposed to
regulate tender offers. In this regard, Rep. Moss said: "It is not the purpose to prevent
the making of any such offers, but solely the purpose of seeing that investors adequately
are informed of the relative merits of their position before and after accepting such offer
so that they can make a judgment properly required." HEAPnsos, supra note 58, at 1.
65 A corporation can cease sending SEC-required proxy statements and annual reports
to stockholders by reducing the total number of shareholders to below 300. 15 U.S.C.
§ 781(g)(4) (1970).
66 Exchanges link delisting to a reduction in the stock's "float." See Going Private
at 904 n.7.
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Moreover, even if such a test were within the rulemaking author-
ity of the Commission, the vagueness inherent in a "valid business pur-
pose" requirement militates against its adoption. It is difficult to pre-
dict what the term "valid" will mean to either the SEC or the courts,6 T
and cases where state courts have examined the purpose behind trans-
actions affecting control of the corporation, in order to rule on an alleged
breach of fiduciary obligations, offer little guidance on the question."8
The vagueness of the test would necessarily impose costs which are un-
justifiable unless one views as a great inequity the involuntary divesti-
ture of a shareholder's ownership interest where adequate consideration
is paid.6 9
The most obvious cost of vagueness is the extensive litigation which
will be required to define the meaning of the valid business purpose re-
quirement. Since there is no reason to believe that federal courts would
be more successful in this endeavor than state courts have been, such a
cost seems unacceptable. Secondly, the vagueness of the test and the
variety of results in analogous state cases would encourage strike suits,
actions motivated primarily by the leverage for settlement which any
uncertain standard engenders. Finally, uncertainty coupled with the ac-
companying potential for strike suits would have a deterrent effect upon
management, discouraging attempts at going private even where such
action is in the best interest of the corporation. On balance therefore,
even apart from the issue of SEC authority, application of a valid busi-
67 One commentator has argued that going private offers management the ultimate pro-
tection against a "raid," and that to the extent public policy tolerates freedom to raid,
policy should also permit management defensive tactics. Therefore, going private as a de-
fensive tactic by a profitable management of a going concern should be deemed "valid.
Borden at 1014. Indications are that a narrower view of validity is contemplated, ex-
cluding purposes such as seeking deregulation. See Sommer, supra note 4, passim; cf. Chair-
man Cohen's remarks on repurchases to preserve control, HEARraGs, supra note 58, at 15.
See generally, Kerr, Going Private: Adopting a Corporate Purpose Standard, 3 SEC. REG.
L.J. 33 (1975).
6
sSee, e.g., Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962); Condec Corp. v.
Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (Ch. 1967); Anderson v. Albert & I.M.
Anderson Mfg. Co., 325 Mass. 343, 90 N.E.2d 541 (1950). Contra, Cheff v. Mathes, 41
Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964); Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (Ch.
1960); see also Herald Co. v. Bonfils, 315 F. Supp. 497 (D. Colo. 1970); Drachman v.
Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1972) (redemption in order to prevent dilution of control-
ling shareholder's position); Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology in Transactions Affecting Corpo-
rate Control, 65 Mica. L. REv. 259, 269-77, 289-99 (1967). Freezeouts have been upheld
when they were the last step in an amalgamation; presumably there the elimination of the
minority was pursuant to the purpose of amalgamation. See Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin
& Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla. 1974); Kerr, Going Private: Adopting a
Corporate Purpose Standard, 3 SEC. REG. L.J. 33, 48-52 (1975); cf. Establishing Federal
Standards at 674-75.
69 Some commentators have suggested that adequate consideration for a shareholder
eliminated in a going private transaction must include that holder's pro rata share of the
"benefits" go'ng private engenders. Establishing Federal Standards at 652. But shareholders
eliminated in mergers are systematically held not to be entitled to any comparable pro rata
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ness purpose test to going private transactions seems ill-advised.7" It
may be asked, however, whether a guarantee of fair dealing, as provided
by other of the proposed rules, would satisfy the congressional directive
and the policies of the federal securities laws.
Proposed Rule i3e-3 Fairness Requirements
Both formulations of the proposed rules require fairness in the going
private transaction. 7' Rule 13e-3B provides that the terms of the deal
share in the synergistic benefits likely to accrue to the newly merged entity; to the extent
involuntary divestiture serves a policy of corporate flexibility, no argument has been con-
vincingly advanced to show why the treatment in going private situations should be any
different. Even were there some plausible reason for prorating future benefits, the value
of such unrealized benefits would prove virtually impossible to measure. The wiser course
is to adhere to the fair price rule, and promulgate rules ensuring that shareholders being
eliminated in a going pivate transaction receive a fair price for their pre-transaction interest.
0to Cf. Establishing Federal Standards at 674. But see id. at 657 n.97.
7t- Proposed rule 13e-3A(b):
(b) Scope of the Rule. It shall be unlawful for any issuer, or any affiliate of such
issuer at the commencement of a Rule 13e-3 transaction, to engage in a Rule
13e-3 transaction with respect to a class of equity securities of such issuer
unless such issuer or affiliate complies with all of the conditions set forth in
paragraph (c) of this rule.
Proposed rule 13e-3A(c) (2):
(2) The consideration for the equity securities to be purchased shall consti-
tute fair value to the security holders of such class of the issuer who are
not affiliates as determined in good faith by the issuer or its affiliate, and
shall be no lower than that recommended jointly by two qualified inde-
pendent persons. Such persons, in recommending the consideration, shall
consider, among other factors, the value of the assets and earning power
of the issuer. They shall each:
(i) after reasonable investigation, have reasonable grounds to believe, and
believe, that their jointly recommended consideration constitutes fair
value to the security holders of the issuer of such class who are not
affiliates; and
(ii) submit to the issuer a written report and an opinion based thereon
regarding the fairness of the recommended consideration to security
holders of the issuer of such class who are not affiliates, setting forth
the procedures followed, the basis for and the method of arriving at
the recommended consideration, and any limitation imposed by the
issuer or affiliate on the scope of the investigation; such report and
opinion shall be available for inspection and copying by any interested
equity security holder of the issuer at the executive offices of the issuer
during its regular business hours.
Proposed rule 13e-3B(a):
(a) It shall be unlawful, as a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or
practice, for any issuer which has a class of equity securities registered under Sec-
tion 12 of the Act or which files reports pursuant to Section 15(d) of the Act
(the "issuer") or any person controlling, controlled by or under common control
with the issuer (an "affiliate"), to enter into any transaction involving a purchase,
directly or indirectly, of any equity security of the issuer which does have, or is
intended to have, any of the effects described in subsection (b) hereof unless:
(1) if such transaction is entered into by the issuer, such issuer has a
valid business purpose for doing so; and
(2) the terms of such transaction, including any consideration to be paid
to any security holder, are fair.
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and the consideration must be fair. While it is true that the need to
curtail devious practices may counsel vesting discretionary powers in
regulatory agencies, 72 the open-ended requirement that the "terms" be
fair calls for the exercise of an extremely broad discretion on the part
of the SEC. For example, under such a test the SEC could decide that
unfair "terms" included offering to exchange debenture securities for
outstanding equity shares; arguably the decision to exchange the status
of a shareholder for that of creditor rests, as a matter of federal securi-
ties policy, with the properly informed shareholder, not with the Com-
mission. It is for this reason that the alternative proposal in Rule 13e-
3A is preferable: although providing that the shareholder shall receive
fair value for his interest, the 13e-3A rule goes far toward ensuring the
efficacy of the fairness requirement by providing a method of valuation. 73
Two independent appraisers are to determine a fair price for the shares
in question, taking into account asset values and earning potential
"among other factors," all of which must be disclosed in the appraisers'
final report. They must also set forth the means by which they arrived
at their valuation and stipulate the reasonable grounds for their opinion.
The appraisers' joint report is to be available to any shareholder of
the issuer.
Rule 13e-3A thus amounts to a federal provision for mandatory
appraisal, providing for the protection of investors by ensuring a fair
price. This version of the going private rules offers several advantages
over state appraisal remedies: 7 (a) the scheme would, through man-
datory appraisal prior to the transaction, usually eliminate the delay
and expense which are the inevitable costs of exercising appraisal rights
under state statutes; (b) the scheme would provide, through its admin-
istration by the SEC, for a uniform system of valuation; (c) statutes or
case law limiting dissenters to appraisal based upon current market price
would be avoided; (d) a federal appraisal scheme would eliminate the
anomaly of otherwise similarly situated shareholders receiving different
treatment simply because they own shares in corporations incorporated
in different states; (e) stockholders would have a federal cause of action
to raise claims of abuse or manipulation of the appraisal process.75
The legislative history discussed above7" indicates that the preven-
tion of going private transactions is not a proper object of the rule-
72 See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971)
(dictum).73 Proposed Rule 13e-3A(b), (c)(2), supra notes 9, 11.
74 See notes 22-28 supra & text accompanying.
75 The securities laws provide that district courts shall have jurisdiction over causes of
action arising under the federal securities provisions. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v, 78aa (1970).
76 See notes 53-63 supra & text accompanying.
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making authority of the SEC. Congress has spoken to the issue of the
appropriate scope of SEC rulemaking power in this area. Given the
fact that the going private phenomenon has developed since the enact-
ment of section 13, 77 it is clear that the Rule 13e-3B "valid business
purpose" test was not "intended" by Congress. In addition, the strong
possibility that such a test would be unworkably vague in itself argues
against its adoption. On the other hand, the Rule 13e-3A provision for
an independent valuation is within the authority of the Commission.
This version seems more practicable and its several advantages over state
appraisal rights promise to alleviate the most serious inequity in going
private transactions, unfairness of price. Rule 13e-3A therefore seems
to provide the maximum degree of shareholder protection consistent
with the limits of SEC authority, and the conflicting demands of other
policies.
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE PROPOSED RULES
Congress plainly did intend that the SEC assure the availability
of adequate information to any shareholder faced with a tender offer or
similar device for the reacquisition of shares. The proposed rules re-
quire any issuer or affiliate seeking to undertake a going private trans-
action to disclose to shareholders, in addition to information typical of
disclosure requirements in other areas of federal securities regulation,78
certain facts particularly relevant to the decision confronting a share-
holder in a going private situation. Among these are the likely effects
of the transaction on the issuer; whether the officers, directors and
affiliates will tender, sell, or vote their securities in favor of the trans-
action; the market performance of the securities for the previous two
years; and, if the securities were offered to the public during the previ-
ous five years, the price per share and aggregate proceeds of the offer-
ings. These facts are all relevant to an informed decision as to whether
the price offered pursuant to the appraisers' report is in fact fair value
for the shareholder's interest.79
The required disclosure of pertinent information promises to make
the independent appraisers' valuation report more meaningful, and to-
gether these provisions will help shareholders make a rational decision
in those going private transactions where a meaningful choice is avail-
able. By requiring such disclosure and providing for the independent
77 Note 53 supra.
7 8 See note 30 supra; cf. 13e-3A(c)(1), APPENDIX B.
79 Such a demonstration of fair price is the objective of the independent appraisers'
joint report, required by 13e-3A(c) (2).
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appraisal of the fair price of the interests affected by a going private
transaction, the proposed rules would go far to alleviate the problems
such transactions have engendered.
CONCLUSION
Going private transactions usually present conflicts between insider
interests and the interests of shareholders facing take-out. Minority
shareholders have encountered substantial difficulties in seeking fair
compensation for their surrendered interests. Existing common and
statutory law in the states has failed to provide adequate protection,
and the unwillingness of the federal courts to look beyond compliance
with disclosure requirements has effectively denied any alternative re-
view of substantive fairness.
The SEC has proposed to ensure fair treatment for minority share-
holders through the promulgation of one of two alternative fairness
provisions, as well as disclosure requirements specifically tailored to the
needs of shareholders facing a going private transaction. The Rule 1ie-
3B alternative, which requires a showing that the transaction is pur-
suant to a valid business purpose, is beyond the scope of the rulemaking
authority delegated to the SEC by Congress. Moreover, even were this
not so, the uncertainty and confusion which would accompany adoption
of such a standard cannot be justified by concerns about the perceived
inequity of involuntary divestment or the legitimate expectations of
investors.
On the other hand, the Rule 13e-3A version, by requiring indepen-
dent appraisal of shares, provides a workable scheme of protection from
going private abuses. This alternative is within the rulemaking power
of the Commission and seems to provide as much protection for investor
expectations as is consistent with the demands of corporate flexibility
and administrative practicality. Though this version would frustrate
any unreasonable expectation that a public company must ever remain
public, it would protect the more important expectation that a corpora-
tion will not divest shareholders of their interests for less than fair
compensation. Such a scheme is reasonably designed to prevent abuses
in going private transactions and would, unlike Rule 13e-3B, be con-
sistent with the policies of the federal securities laws. It recognizes that
investors in public companies expect to benefit from its public status:
the shareholder expects to have access to corporate information and ex-
pects that the corporation's compliance with the applicable provisions of
the federal securities laws will benefit him. An administrative rule en-
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suring that investors receive fair value for interests affected by going
private protects the most important of these expectations. The SEC
can best protect investors without unduly hindering corporate flexibility
by the adoption of Rule 13e-3A.
LARRY R. SCHREITER
APPENDIX A
13e-3A. (a) Definitions. For purposes of the rule, the following definitions
shall apply:
(1) Affiliate. An "affiliate" of an issuer is a person that directly, or indirectly
through one or more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under com-
mon control with such issuer.
(2) Class of Equity Securities. The term "class of equity securities" shall in-
clude any security convertible or exchangeable into, or any warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase any security of such class.
(3) Executive Officer. The term "executive officer" means the president, secre-
tary, treasurer, any vice president in charge of a principal business function (such
as sales, administration or finance) and any other person who performs similar
policy-making functions for the issuer.
(4) Purchase. A "purchase" means any acquisition for value or any contract
to buy, purchase or acquire, including any "short form" merger and any purchase
of fractional shares in connection with a reverse split.
(5) Rule 13e-3 Transaction. A "Rule 13e-3 transaction" is any transaction
described in subsection (i) which, directly or indirectly, might have any of the
effects or is part of a plan which might have any of the effects described in sub-
paragraph (ii):
(i) Types of Transactions:
(A) a purchase of any equity security;
(B) a cash tender offer, an exchange offer, or any other tender offer for or
request or invitation for tenders of any equity security; or
(C) a solicitation of any proxy, consent or authorization of a holder of
any equity security in connection with any merger, consolidation or similar
business combination transaction between an issuer (or its subsidiaries) and
its affiliates; a sale of substantially all of the assets of an issuer to its affiliate;
or a reverse split of any equity security involving the purchase of fractional
shares.
(ii) Effects of Transaction:
(A) causing a class of equity securities to be subject to delisting from a
national securities exchange;
(B) causing a class of equity securities to be eligible for termination of
registration pursuant to Section 12(g) (4) of the Act;
(C) causing an issuer to be eligible for suspension of reporting obligations
pursuant to Section 15(d) of the Act as at the beginning of the next fiscal year
of the issuer; or
(D) causing a class of equity securities which is authorized to be quoted
in an inter-dealer quotation system of a registered national securities associa-
tion to cease to be so authorized.
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(b) Scope of the Rule. It shall be unlawful for any issuer, or any affiliate of
such issuer at the commencement of a Rule 13e-3 transaction, to engage in a Rule
13e-3 transaction with respect to a class of equity securities of such issuer unless
such issuer or affiliate complies with all of the conditions set forth in paragraph (c)
of this rule.
NOTE: A person who is not an affiliate of the issuer at the commencement of
such person's tender offer for the equity securities of the issuer will not
become an affiliate of that issuer for purposes of this rule prior to the
termination of that tender offer.
(d) Exceptions. This rule shall not apply to:
(1) transactions by a holding company registered under the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935;
(2) transactions by an investment company registered under the Investment
Company Act of 1940; or
(3) redemptions, calls or other similar purchases of an equity security by an
issuer pursuant to specific provisions set forth in the instrument(s) creating or
governing that class of equity securities.
Rule 13e-3B(b) :
(b) Subsection (a) [note 11 supra] hereof shall apply to any transaction which
has, or is intended to have, any of the following effects:
(1) compelling any security holder of the issuer to terminate his equity interest
in the issuer;
(2) reducing, directly or indirectly, by 25 percent or more, the amount of
any class of equity securities of the issuer outstanding prior to the transaction and
held beneficially by persons other than the issuer and its affiliates;
(3) causing a class of equity securiites of the issuer to be subject to delisting
from a national securities exchange;
(4) causing a class of equity securities of the issuer to be eligible for termina-
tion of registration pursuant to Section 12(g)(4) of the Act;
(5) causing the issuer to be eligible for suspension of reporting obligations
pursuant to Section 15(d) of the Act as at the beginning of the next fiscal year of
the issuer; or
(6) causing a class of equity securities of the issuer which is authorized to be
quoted in an inter-dealer quotation system of a registered national securities asso-
ciation to cease to be so authorized.
(c) Subsection (a) hereof shall not apply to:
(1) transactions between or among affiliates of the issuer not involving the
issuer or any security holder of the issuer other than an affiliate;
(2) any transaction involving a purchase of a security for which specific pro-
visions have been made in any instrument creating or governing that security;
(3) transactions by a holding company registered under the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935; or
(4) transactions by an investment company registered under the Investment
Company Act of 1940.
APPENDIX B
13e-3A. (c) Conditions to be Met. A Rule 13e-3 transaction shall be un-
lawful unless all of the following conditions are met:
(1) The issuer or affiliate shall send the following information in accordance
with the provisions of any applicable, federal, state or other law, but in no event
later than 20 days prior to any purchase or any vote, consent or authorization, to
each person who was a record holder as of a date not more than 30 days prior to
the date of mailing and to each person known to such issuer or affiliate to have
been as of such record date a beneficial owner of the class of equity securities sub-
ject to the Rule 13e-3 transaction:
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(i) The title of the class of equity securities to which the transaction relates;
(ii) If the Rule 13e-3 transaction is to be effected by an affiliate, (A) the
identity of the affiliate; (B) the identity of any executive officer, director or parent
of the affiliate; (C) the principal business, occupation or employment of each per-
son identified in (A) or (B) for the.last 5 years, including the name and principal
business of the organization with which such employment was carried on, and (D)
the date(s), nature of conviction, name and location of court and penalty or other
disposition of any conviction in a criminal proceeding (excluding traffic violations
or similar misdemeanors) during the 5 years for each such person;
(iii) The source and amount of funds or other consideration to be used in
making the purchases; and if any part of the purchase price or the proposed pur-
chase price is represented or is to be represented by funds or other consideration
borrowed or otherwise obtained, describe the terms of the transaction and the iden-
tity of the parties thereto;
(iv) The purpose or purposes of the proposed transaction, including but not
limited to any plans or proposals to liquidate the issuer, to sell its assets or merge
it with any other person, or to make any other material change in its management,
business or corporate structure;
(v) Any contracts, arrangements, or understandings involving the issuer or
affiliate with respect to any securities of the issuer, including but not limited to
transfer of any of the securities, joint ventures, loan or option arrangements, puts
or calls, guaranties of loans, guaranties against loss or guaranties of profits, divi-
sion of losses or profits, or the giving or withholding of proxies, naming the per-
sons with whom such contracts, arrangements, or understandings have been entered
into, and describing the material provisions thereof;
(vi) The identity of all persons and classes of persons employed, retained or
to he compensated by the issuer or affiliate or by any person on behalf of the issuer
or affiliate to make solicitations or recommendations to security holders in connec-
tion with a Rule 13e-3 transaction and the terms of such employment, retainer or
arrangement for compensation.
(vii) A description of the effect of the proposed transaction on the issuer, its
affiliates and non-affiliated security holders of the class of equity securities, and a
description of the terms or arrangements of the proposed transaction relating to
any security holder which are not identical to those relating to other security
holders;
(viii) An opinion of counsel respecting the legality of the transaction under
the law of the state or other jurisdiction under the laws of which the issuer was
organized;
(ix) A statement of the intentions of executive officers, directors and affiliates
of the person effecting the Rule 13e-3 transaction as to whether they will or will
not tender or sell or vote securities of the issuer owned or held by them or vote
securities with respect to which they hold proxies and the reasons therefor;
(x) The two years audited financial statements required to be filed with the
issuer's most recent annual report under Sections 13 and 15(d) of the Act, together
with a balance sheet as of the last day of the most recent period subsequent to the
end of the last fiscal year for which a quarterly report was required to be filed
pursuant to the Act, and statements of income, retained earnings and changes in
financial position for the period then ended and for the corresponding period of
the preceding fiscal year;
(xi) Pro forma data showing the effect of the proposed transaction on (A) the
issuer's most recent balance sheet furnished pursuant to (x) above; (B) the issuer's
statement of income for the last fiscal year or the 12-month period prior to the
date of the balance sheet referred to in (A) above; (C) book value per share as
of the date of the balance sheet referred to in (A) above; and (D) the ratio of
earnings to fixed charges for the period referred to in (B) above;
(xii) The frequency and amount of any dividends with respect to such class
of equity securities during the last two years, any restrictions on the issuer's ability
to pay dividends and any plan or intention to declare a dividend or to alter the
dividend policy of the issuer in the future;
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(xiii) The amount of the issuer's equity securities beneficially owned as of the
most recent practicable date by any executive officer, director or affiliate of the
issuer, or any pension, profit sharing or similar plan of the issuer or affiliate; the
aggregate amount of the issuer's equity securities purchased directly or indirectly
during the preceding two years, if any, and the aggregate dollar amounts paid for
such securities by the issuer, any executive officer, director or affiliate and any pen-
sion or profit sharing or similar plan of the issuer or affiliate; and the number of
securities purchased and the price per share paid during the last 60 days by each
such person.
(xiv) A general description of the federal tax consequences of the proposed
transaction to the issuer and its security holders;
(xv) If there is an established market for such class of equity securities, the
high and low sale prices of such securities (or in the case of trading in the over-
the-counter market, or in the absence of trading on an exchange during a particu-
lar period, the range of representative high and low bid and asked quotations) for
each quarterly period within the past two years and the nature of the market and
source of the quotations. If the securities are traded on one or more exchanges,
the name of the principal exchange should be given. If there is no established
trading market excluding limited or sporadic quotations, it should be so stated;
(xvi) The offering price per share, subject to appropriate adjustments, the
aggregate proceeds received by the issuer and the proceeds received by each affiliate
of the issuer, if securities of the class were offered to the public by the issuer or
affiliates during the five years preceding the date of the proposed transaction;
(xvii) A fair and adequate summary of the reports, opinions and the joint
recommendation required by subparagraph (c)(2); the method of selection of the
persons giving such recommendation and opinions, any material relationship be-
tween such person or its affiliates and the issuer or its affiliates which then exists
or is mutually understood to be contemplated or which has existed at any time
during the previous two years, and any compensation received or to be received
as a result of such relationship;
(xviii) A reasonably itemized statement of all expenses incurred or estimated
to be incurred in connection with a proposed Rule 13e-3 transaction, including but
not limited to filing fees, legal, accounting and appraisal fees, solicitation expenses,
and printing costs.
(xix) A fair and adequate summary of any appraisal obtained by or for the
issuer or its affiliate regarding the issuer, its material assets, or securities within the
last two years.
(xx) Such additional material information, if any, as may be necessary to make
the required statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they are
made, not materially misleading.
(c)(3) If an issuer or affiliate engages in a Rule 13e-3 transaction involving
a cash tender offer, an exchange offer or any other tender offer for or request or
invitation for tenders of any equity security:
(i) the issuer or affiliate shall file with the Commission eight copies of any
written offer or request or invitation for tenders which shall contain the informa-
tion required by subparagraph (c)(1) and any additional solicitation material at
the time any copies of the offer or request or invitation for tenders are first sent to
holders of the equity securities, but in no event later than 20 days prior to any
purchase pursuant to such offer, request or invitation;
(ii) if any material change occurs in the information filed pursuant to sub-
section (c)(4)(i), eight copies of an amendment shall promptly be filed with the
Commission to reflect such change;
(iii) securities deposited pursuant to a tender offer subject to this subparagraph
may be withdrawn by or on behalf of a tendering security holder at any time prior
to the acceptance for purchase of such securities by the issuer or affiliate;
(iv) if more securities are deposited during the twenty days between the day
on which the offer is first sent to security holders and the first day on which securi-
ties may be accepted for purchase than the issuer or affiliate is bound or willing to
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accept for purchase, any securities accepted for purchase shall be accepted on a
pro rata basis as nearly as is practicable disregarding fractional shares;
(v) if the consideration offered to security holders in a tender offer subject to
this subparagraph is increased, the increased consideration shall be paid for all
securities accepted for purchase in the Rule 13e-3 transaction regardless of whether
such securities were accepted prior to the increase in consideration;
(vi) any purchase by the issuer or affiliate within sixty days subsequent to the
expiration of a tender offer subject to this subparagraph shall be deemed to be made
pursuant to such tender offer;
(vii) If the consummation of such a transaction results in one of the effects
described in subdivision (a) (5) (ii) (B) or (C) of this rule, or results in the effect
described in subdivision (a) (5) (ii) (A) of this rule and the issuer is not subject to
Section 12 or 15(d) of the Act, the issuer or its affiliate within 30 days after such
consummation must:
A. notify any remaining holder of equity securities of that class regarding the
result and effect of the transaction; and
B. offer to purchase the securities held by each remaining security holder for
the same consideration paid in the Rule 13e-3 transaction for a period of at least
20 days following the day the notice required by this subparagraph is sent to each
remaining security holder.
